Introduction
The most rapidly emerging technology for human authentication is biometrics. It can be defined as the analysis of physiological or behavioral people characteristics for automatic human recognition. Biometric authentication relies on who a person is or what a person does, in contrast with traditional approaches, which are based on what a person knows ͑password͒ or has ͑ID card͒. 1, 2 Biometric authentication is based on strictly personal traits, which are much more difficult to be forgotten, lost, stolen, copied, or forged than traditional data. Loosely speaking, biometric systems are essentially pattern recognition applications, performing authentication using biometric attributes derived from physiological or behavioral characteristics that persons possess.
Biometric authentication systems consist of two stages: the enrollment subsystem and the authentication subsystem. In the enrollment stage, biometric data are captured from a subject and checked for their quality. Then relevant information is extracted and eventually stored in a database. As for the authentication subsystem, two modalities can be implemented:
• Verification: the subject who claims an identity presents some form of identifier ͑such as user ID, ATM card͒ and a biometric characteristic. The system extracts some features from the acquired data and compares the features in the database corresponding to the provided ID and the acquired ones.
• Identification: the system acquires the biometric sample from the subject, extracts some features from the raw measurements, and searches the entire database for matches using the extracted biometric features.
Biometric Data Protection
As mentioned, biometrics represents an alternative to traditional authentication approaches, able to guarantee improved security and comfort for users. However, the use of biometric data involves various risks not affecting other methods employed for automatic people recognition: if a biometric characteristic is somehow stolen or copied, it cannot simply be replaced. Moreover, biometric data can contain relevant information regarding personality and health that can be used in an unauthorized manner for malicious or undesired intents. 3, 4 Therefore, when designing a biometrics-based system, the issue of security has to be carefully considered. As Ratha et al. described, the potential attacks on a biometric system can be perpetrated at the sensor, where fake biometrics can be presented, or at the feature extractor, which could be forced to produce preselected features. 5 Moreover, the template matcher can be attacked to produce an artificially high or low match score and the database can be corrupted in order to steal or substitute the stored templates. Finally, the channels interconnecting the different parts of a biometric system can be intercepted and controlled by unauthorized people.
We focus here on the protection of the stored templates. Although it was commonly believed that it is not possible to reconstruct the original biometric data starting from the corresponding extracted template, some concrete counterexamples that contradict this assumption have been pro-vided in the recent literature for faces 6 and fingerprints. 7 Moreover, even if it is either not possible or computationally unfeasible to reconstruct the original biometric data from a stolen template, it is not wise to use the compromised template for other applications. Therefore, the need to replace the violated template with a secure one arises. However, while a password can be changed as many times as the user wants, the same is not possible for biometrics since they are in limited number and cannot be easily changed by the user. The necessity to replace a compromised template has led to the concept of cancelable biometrics, which Ratha et al. introduced. 8 Roughly speaking, a cancelable template is obtained from original biometrics, enrollment or authentication stage, by applying an intentional, repeatable distortion based on a chosen transform. Since only the distorted data are stored in the database, even if the database is compromised, the biometric data cannot be retrieved. Moreover, different templates can be generated from the original data simply by changing the employed transform's parameters.
Several approaches have already been proposed in order to secure biometric templates, usually consisting of cryptosystem schemes or secret key-generating algorithms. Davida et al. 9 applied error correction codes to protect iris templates, while Monrose et al. 10 19 and for fingerprints, 20 as well as for face recognition. 21 As for biometric signature protection, Vielhauer proposed the initial approach, 22 which they detailed later. 23 A set of parametric features is extracted from each dynamic signature and an interval matrix is used to store the upper and lower admitted thresholds for correct authentication. Feng and Chan proposed similar approach. 24 Both methods provide protection for the signature templates. However, the variability of each feature has to be made explicitly available, and the methods do not provide template renewability. Kuan et al. 25 obtained biometric secrecy preservation and renewability by applying random tokens, together with multiple-bit discretization and permutation, to the function features extracted from the signatures. Moreover, Freire-Santos et al. 26 deployed the fuzzy vault scheme 14 for signature template protection. Watermarking techniques have also been proposed as a solution for the protection of biometric templates. 27 For example, a timestamp can be embedded into each template in such a way that the template is useless after the expiration date. Alternatively, the template can be embedded into a host signal to make its presence undetectable. 28 Maiorana et al. proposed robust watermarking techniques to embed dynamic signature information into a signature image, 29, 30 while Pankanti and Yeung suggested a fragile watermarking method for fingerprint verification in order to detect tampering while not lowering authentication performances. 31 
Dynamic Signature Biometrics
In this section, we provide some introductory concepts regarding the use of signatures for biometric-based authentication. Human recognition based on signatures is one of the most accepted biometric-based authentication methods, since most users perceive it as noninvasive and nonthreatening. Moreover, signature is one of the most reliable behavioral biometrics together with speech, it is characterized by high collectibility, and, eventually, it has a high legal value. 32 Signature recognition can be either static or dynamic: in the first operation mode, also referred to as offline, only the signature image is acquired in a digitized form through an optical scanner or a camera. In the second operation mode, also defined as online, signatures are acquired by a digitizer tablet or by means of a pen-sensitive computer display. These devices usually capture the position of the pen ͓in x͑t͒-and y͑t͒-coordinates, where t the temporal coordinate͔ and the pressure p͑t͒ applied by the pen. To accomplish recognition or verification, further information can be inferred from x͑t͒, y͑t͒, and p͑t͒ such as global or local velocity, acceleration, or strokes. Online signatures are clearly more difficult to forge than offline ones; therefore, they are more suitable for personal authentication in legal and commercial transactions.
Dimauro et al. presented comprehensive survey of the principal existing methods for both static and dynamic biometric signature recognition. 33 Basically, the approaches can be broadly classified as those based on segmentations ͑see, for example, Ref. 34͒, those based on the statistical model ͑as in Ref. 35͒ , and those that rely on feature extraction. Specifically, two types of features can be used for signature verification: parameters or functions. When parameters are used as features, the signature is characterized as a vector of elements ͑see, for example, Ref. 36͒, whereas when functions are used as features, the signature is characterized in terms of a set of time functions ͑see, for example, Ref. 37͒.
In this paper, we extend our earlier work, 38 applying the fuzzy commitment scheme to a set of parametric features extracted from dynamic signatures. More specifically, we propose a cryptosystem tuned to the user signature variability, thus obtaining a user-adaptive approach capable of providing the required security and renewability for the stored signature templates.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the proposed biometric protection scheme, outlines the reliable feature selection principles, and details the proposed nonadaptive and the user-adaptive methods. Extensive experimental results, including comparisons with existing approaches, are given in Section 3. Finally, Section 4 concludes the paper.
Biometric Protection Scheme
This section presents the proposed scheme for biometric template protection. As mentioned, it is basically based on Juels' proposal of fuzzy commitment using error-correcting codes. 13 The proposed approach is twofold, allowing the system both to manage cancelable biometrics 8 and to handle the intraclass variability exhibited by biometric signatures. As can be expected from a behavioral biometric, different signature realizations, taken from a user, can exhibit a lot of variability, mainly due to the user's not having developed a habit and to the different conditions of execution ͑seated or standing position, wide or narrow area for resting the arms, etc.͒. The signature variability here is handled by considering the obtained templates as noisy versions of the "ideal" template, where the noise power is related to the actual signature deviation from the noise-free template. Figures 1 and 3 show the schemes of the proposed enrollment and authentication procedure, respectively.
Enrollment Stage
The proposed enrollment scheme is presented in Fig. 1 . In brief, during the enrollment phase, a number I of signatures are recorded for each subject s. Some features, properly chosen, are extracted from the signatures acquired from user s and collected in the vectors f i s , i =1, ... ,I, which are then binarized using the intraclass s and the interclass vector mean, which are stored in the template regarding user s. Then, for each subject s, only the most reliable features are selected, their indices are saved, and the representative binary vector x s is obtained. Protection is performed by summing to x s a codeword c s generated as the output of a BCH encoder fed by a randomly generated binary word m s . The vector FC s thus obtained is then stored together with the hashed version h͑m͒ s of m s and the information regarding the BCH code employed. The stored information can be used to perform user authentication without revealing any information about the original data, as indicated in Section 2.2.
The proposed scheme is described in the following subsections.
Statistics evaluation and binarization
During enrollment, I signatures are acquired from each user s, and from each of them P parametric features are extracted and collected in the features vectors f i s , i =1, ... ,I. The intraclass s and the interclass vector mean are then estimated as
where S is the number of enrolled subjects. From the I signatures acquired from user s, a binary vector b s representative of the considered P features is then obtained that compares the intraclass s with the interclass vectors:
Reliable feature selection
In the proposed scheme, given a user s, after having determined the representative vector b s , a selection of the relevant features is performed in order to reduce the feature space dimensionality taken into account in the authentication stage. Only subjects' most reliable features are selected, thus counteracting the potential instability, for the single user, of the vector feature components. In Ref. 21 , where features extracted from faces are considered, this task is accomplished using a reliability measure obtained by assuming a Gaussian distribution for each considered face feature.
However, the Gaussianity assumption does not apply to the scenario under examination. In fact, extensive tests have pointed out that the majority of commonly used signature features, like mean velocity, acceleration, or pressure, cannot be properly modeled according to either a Gaussian or a generalized Gaussian distribution. Figure 2 shows the histogram of four common features ͑time duration, average absolute X-velocity, average absolute Y-velocity, average absolute X-acceleration͒ extracted from a set of signatures, together with the Gaussian and generalized Gaussian probability density functions, whose param- eters are estimated from the experimental data. Testing of fit of the Gaussian or the generalized Gaussian distribution to the data has also been performed. Specifically, the goodness-of-fit ͑GOF͒, Chi-squared, Cramer-von Mises test, and Anderson-Darling tests 39 have been used. The obtained results, collected in Table 1 , highlight the poor match between the experimental data and the considered distributions. Therefore, in our approach we introduce a reliability measure not directly related to the signature feature distribution.
In the process of defining a reliable feature selection, for each user s, the enrolled feature vectors f i s , with i =1, ... ,I, are binarized by comparisons with the interclass mean and collected as row vectors in a binary matrix B s , with I ͑signature samples͒ rows and P ͑features͒ columns, whose generic element B s ͓i , p͔ is obtained as
Then, the reliability R 1 s ͓p͔ of the pth feature is defined as follows:
Authentication scheme: when a subject claims his identity, a response is given using the stored data , RF s , FC s , ECC s , and h͑m s ͒.
Fig. 2
Fitting of four common signature feature distributions to Gaussian and generalized Gaussian model: ͑a͒ time duration; ͑b͒ average absolute X-velocity; ͑c͒ average absolute Y-velocity; ͑d͒ average absolute X-acceleration.
where represents the XOR operation and b s is given by Eq. ͑2͒. Equation ͑4͒ evaluates the occurrence of the pth binary value b s ͓p͔ in the corresponding elements of the binary matrix B s : this derives a measure of the representativeness of the value b s ͓p͔, with respect to the possible values obtainable from a new signature by the same user. According to this measure, components with a high reliability possess a high discrimination capability.
However, the use of the reliability measure R 1 s ͓p͔ can lead to components with the same reliability value. Then, in order to further discriminate among them, we introduce a second level of feature screening, according to the following reliability measure:
where
is the standard deviation of the pth feature of subject s. A higher discriminating power is thus trusted to features with a larger difference between s ͓p͔ and ͓p͔, relative to the standard deviation s ͓p͔. After the application of the reliability metrics to b s , we end up with the binary feature vector r s containing the PЈ most reliable components of b s . The indexes of the most reliable feature for the user s are collected in RF s , which is stored, together with the interclass vector , being made available for the authentication process.
As already pointed out, in order to achieve both template protection and renewability, our scheme uses errorcorrecting codes ͑BCH codes͒. 40 The error correction capability ͑ECC͒ of the codes can be selected a priori as in Van der Veen et al., 21 this approach is detailed in the next subsection.
In this paper, we propose an error-correcting code selection procedure depending on the intraclass variability of each user's signature, as pointed out ahead.
A priori selection of error correction capability
After having obtained the binary feature vector r s , we use BCH codes to realize the fuzzy commitment. The ECC of the employed BCH encoder, and therefore the length n of its codewords, is selected according to the desired false acceptance rate ͑FAR͒ or false rejection rate ͑FRR͒. Table 2 reports the correspondences between the ECC and the values of n and k, respectively, being the length of the codewords c and the length of the messages to be encoded m.
Once the BCH encoder is chosen, a codeword c s is generated from a randomly selected message m s . Then, the binary vector r s , of PЈ bits as detailed in the previous subsection, is zero-padded in order to reach the same length n of the codeword c s , thus resulting in the vector x s . An XOR operation between the codeword c s and x s is finally performed, thereby obtaining the fuzzy commitment FC:
A hashed version h͑m s ͒ of the random message m s , obtained using the SHA-1 algorithm, 41 is then stored together with FC s . It is worth pointing out that, as is evident from Table 2 , no restriction is introduced for the number PЈ of the reliable features that can be considered, given that PЈ Ͻ n min = 127. However, this constraint can be removed by selecting BCH codes with a longer minimum codeword length n min .
2.1.4
Adaptive selection of error correction capability The approach just described allows renewable templates to be provided by changing the employed codeword c s ͑i.e., the randomly generated message m s ͒ associated to the user during enrollment.
We propose an authentication method that, besides providing renewability, also provides adaptability to the user signature's variability. This implies that we are able to take into account the signature's intravariability, which reflects on bit differences between the enrolled feature vector x s and the feature vector x s obtained in the authentication stage from the same user s ͑see Fig. 3͒ .
Adaptivity is achieved by choosing the BCH code and its ECC, among the set of available codes in Table 2 
is then used to characterize the intraclass variability of the user s. Specifically, the BCH code whose ECC is equal to the nearest integer of ͓Avg s + ⌬ ECC ͔, where ⌬ ECC is a system parameter common to all the enrolled users, is chosen. The selected error correction capability ECC s for user s is stored in the database.
As described earlier, the binary vector r s is zero-padded in order to reach the same length n of the selected BCH codewords, resulting in the vector x s . The fuzzy commitment FC s is then generated using a codeword c s obtained from the encoding of a random message m s :
A hashed version h͑m s ͒ of m s , created using the SHA-1 algorithm, is eventually stored.
The proposed framework provides security, as it is impossible to retrieve f s from the stored templates , RF s , FC s , h͑m s ͒, and ECC s . In fact, in order to infer about the extracted features, or to reconstruct their binary counterparts, it is necessary to possess, among the other data ͑see Fig. 1͒ , the BCH codeword c s employed for data protection. However, neither the binary word m s at the input of the BCH encoder nor its output c s is stored. In fact, only the hashed value of m s , generated by means of the hash function h͑·͒, is stored, thus guaranteeing the impossibility of recovering useful information from the saved data. Then, Juels and Wattenberg 13 showed, it can be concluded that the disclosure of the secret x s is as hard as finding a collision for the SHA-1 hash h͑m s ͒, which leads to the observation that the security of the system is the same as that of the employed hash function.
Moreover, it is worth pointing out that several attacks, which are able to generate collisions when using the SHA-1 algorithm and having less computational complexity than the brute-force attack, have already been proposed. [42] [43] [44] Therefore, in order to solve this problem and thus improve the system's security for practical applications, two novel hash functions could be used in our scheme without affecting its architecture: the SHA-256 with 32-bit words or the SHA-512 with 64-bit words. The cryptographic security of these hash functions has not been investigated as deeply as the SHA-1's; however, no weakness has been found so far.
Authentication Stage
The authentication phase follows the same steps as the enrollment stage ͑see Fig. 3͒ . When a subject claims his identity, he provides his signature, which is converted in the feature vector f s . Then the quantization is done using the interclass mean , thus obtaining b s . The reliable features r s are selected using RF s and later extended using zero padding, generating x s . A binary vector c s , representing a possibly corrupted BCH codeword, results from the XOR operation
The BCH decoder is selected depending on the encoder used in enrollment, obtaining m s from c s . Finally, the SHA-1 hashed version h͑m s ͒ is compared to h͑m s ͒: if both values are identical, the subject is authenticated.
Experimental Results
This section presents an extensive set of experimental results concerning the performances of the proposed system together with comparisons to other approaches proposed in the literature.
In our experiment, online signatures are acquired using an Interlink Electronics ePadink, based on a resistant touchpad with 300-dpi resolution. The proposed approach consists of extracting a number P of parametric features from the acquired signals, further processed as detailed in Section 2 to obtain security and renewability of the stored templates. Specifically, we first compared the adaptive approach detailed in the last subsection with the nonadaptive one described just before that. Moreover, the proposed approach has been compared with the algorithms proposed in Refs. 23 and 24, which rely on the processing of parametric features extracted from signatures. The selected feature set, composed of 50 parameters enumerated in Table 3 , is the same as in Ref. 23 . Thirty subjects were enrolled. Each gave 50 signatures, which were recorded at different times over one week. As in Ref. 23 , I = 6 signatures are considered in the enrollment stage.
The first experiment was aimed at evaluating the system performance without the use of adaptive BCH code selec-tion. Several BCH codes with different ECC, detailed in Table 2 , have been applied. The system performance was assessed through FRR and FAR, as shown in Fig. 4 . The FRR was estimated by using, for each subject, the 44 signatures not used in the enrollment stage. The FAR referred both to conditions of random forgeries, 32 indicated as FAR RF , and to conditions of skilled forgeries, indicated as FAR SF . For each subject, the 50 signatures of the remaining 29 users were used as random forgeries. When skilled forgeries were considered, a test set of 10 skilled forgeries was created for each subject, using a training time of 10 minutes for each signature whose original was made available. In our experimental setup, the forgerers had the possibility to observe the genuine users when signing, in order to gain a better understanding of the signature dynamics. Figure 4͑a͒ illustrates the system performance using the whole set of features for authentication ͑PЈ =50͒. In order to show the better performance obtainable using the reliable feature selection procedure detailed earlier, Fig. 4͑b͒ displays the system performance achieved when a lower number of features are considered ͑PЈ =40͒. The results are shown with respect to the ECC employed in the system. The receiver operating characteristic ͑ROC͒ curves in Fig.  4͑c͒ report the FAR SF / FRR system behavior for both PЈ = 50 and PЈ = 40. As can be seen, the achieved equal error rate ͑EER͒ is approximately 23% for PЈ = 50 and 22% for PЈ = 40 when considering skilled forgeries. As for random forgeries, the obtained EER is about 10% for PЈ = 50 and 9% for PЈ = 40. In the second experiment, we tested the system using the adaptive code selection scheme we proposed here, which proved able to offer improved performances over the nonadaptive approach. The ECC is selected for each user as detailed earlier. The results are shown with respect to the parameter ⌬ ECC used to determine the proper error correction capability for each user. Figures 5͑a͒ and 5͑b͒ show the system performance using PЈ = 50 and PЈ = 40, respectively, while Fig. 5͑c͒ gives the ROC curves for the adaptive code selection scheme. The achieved equal error rate is approximately 18.50% for PЈ = 50 and 17% for PЈ = 40, considering skilled forgeries. The performances related to random forgeries consist of an EER equal to 8% for PЈ = 50 and 6% for PЈ = 40.
The obtained experimental results highlight that the use of the adaptive code selection method improves the system performance, especially in terms of FAR. Moreover, system performance increases when the original set of features for each user is selected based on the reliability measures introduced in Section 2.1. Finally, a performance comparison among the proposed method, the one where no template protection is taken into account, and those in Refs. 23 and 24 is reported here.
Specifically, we used a Malahanobis distance to compute the distance of a feature vector f from the vector s , representative of user s:
where s 2 represents the feature variance for user s, estimated during enrollment. If the distance is less than a threshold T A , the feature vector f is accepted as originating from user s.
Then Fig. 6 depicts the ROC curves related to the FAR SF / FRR performances of various approaches. Specifically, Fig. 6 shows the performances related to
• a system without any template protection, where the threshold T A is continuously varied,
• a system implementing the approach in Ref. 23 the system parameter b, which acts similarly to a threshold, is continuously varied, • a system implementing the nonadaptive approach presented here, using different ECC values and setting PЈ = 50 in order to present results comparable with those of the other methods, • a system implementing the adaptive approach presented here, using different values of ⌬ ECC and setting PЈ = 50. Table 4 summarizes the performance achievable using a nonprotected approach, the method proposed in Ref. 24 , and the proposed approaches and gives the EERs obtained when considering skilled forgeries.
As is evident from Fig. 6 , the performance of the method proposed in Ref. 24 is very close to that obtainable when no protection is applied: the behavior observed by varying the system parameter b ͑see Appendix A.2 for details͒ is very close to that obtained by varying the authentication threshold in a nonprotected system. Moreover, the performance of the method in Ref. 23 depends on the number of signatures considered in the estimation of the tolerance values t i ͑see Appendix A.1 for details͒, while keeping I = 6 signatures for the enrollment.
As far as the proposed adaptive scheme is concerned, the ROC curves obtained by varying the employed ECC differentiate with respect to the one obtained when no protection is taken into account. As shown in Fig. 6 , a better performance in terms of the FRR is obtained ͑lower value is equal to 4%͒, making the proposed approach more suitable to forensic applications 1 than the other methods considered. Moreover, the best achievable EER is obtained using our adaptive fuzzy commitment approach and is equal to 18.5%. It is worth pointing out that, as shown in Fig. 5͑c͒ , an even better performance can be obtained by using the proposed approach when the parameter reduction is taken into account, and that the proposed method is also able to provide, in addition to template protection, template cancelability, whereas the other methods considered cannot.
Finally, we would like to stress that in our experimental setup we have considered a "closed" set of users in the sense that the estimation of the global mean in Eq. ͑1͒ has been performed by using all users who the system can authenticate. In principle, if a new user is added, the global mean value should be estimated again on the new set of users. However, in real-life applications, where hundreds or thousands of users might be enrolled, we can think to perform the mean estimation on the given set of users as well as for future users.
In order to evaluate the sensitivity of the proposed approach on the mean estimation, given a set of 10 users to authenticate, we have analyzed the following scenarios:
• the interclass vector is estimated on the basis of all 30 users available in our database, also including the 10 users we want to consider for authentication, • the interclass vector is estimated on the basis of only 20 users, who represent a disjoint set from the set of 10 users we want to consider for authentication.
The results we obtained are reported in Fig. 7 , where Fig. 7 Comparison between the performance achievable determining the inter-class mean using signatures taken from 30 users ͑including the 10 users considered during authentication͒ or 20 users ͑without including the 10 users considered during authentication͒: ͑a͒ nonadaptive template protection scheme; ͑b͒ adaptive template protection scheme.
similar results are obtained using 20 or 30 users in the estimation of the interclass mean vector . We believe that enlarging the database, which will be an object of future development, can further reduce the performance differences.
Conclusions
We proposed a user-adaptive template protection scheme applied to signature biometrics. The proposed scheme is able to protect the considered signature templates. Moreover, it allows us to generate multiple templates from the same biometric data, thus enabling us to manage cancelable biometrics. When properly used, error-correcting codes, the original raw data, as well as the template derived from them cannot be reconstructed from the stored information, thus increasing the system's security against possible attacks while allowing user authentication performing comparably to a nonprotected system.
Our protection scheme has been applied to parametric features extracted from the signatures. We provided reliability measure, independent from the feature distributions. Moreover, we implemented a user-adaptive intraclass variability handling in order to customize the error correction capabilities of the employed codes for each enrolled user: in this way, the employed codes are selected based on each user's characteristics, thereby increasing the system performance.
Extensive experimental results have been provided, showing that our system performs as well as a nonprotected system. Comparisons with other, already proposed schemes for signature template protection are also presented.
Further improvements can be accomplished using different feature sets, such as the ones from pen inclinations. Also, tests with different databases than the one we used can be considered. Moreover, the proposed scheme can be adapted to the protection of signature function features, typically able to guarantee better performances than methods based on parameters.
Appendix A This appendix presents a short description of the algorithms proposed in Ref. 23 , referred to as biometric hash, and in Ref. 24 , referred to as BioPKI.
A.1 Biometric Hash
Vielhauer and Steinmetz obtained biometric hash vector, calculated on the basis of an individual interval matrix ͑IM͒, from the acquired signature. 23 The IM is a matrix calculated for each user during the enrollment process. It contains, for each considered feature i, an interval length ⌬I i and an interval offset ⌺ i . The interval length ⌬I i is computed considering the minimum and the maximum value of the extracted signature feature i and then extending the original interval by a tolerance factor t i determined by statistical testing of authentic writing samples. The offset ⌺ i is computed as ⌺ i = I LOW MOD⌬I i , where I LOW represents the lower value of the considered interval.
The biometric hash values are calculated by an interval mapping of each single feature parameter against IM. The hash function that has to be applied to each feature parameter f i can be expressed as
As is evident, all values within the considered interval of acceptance lead to the same integer, whereas values outside the interval lead to different integer values.
A.2 BioPKI
Feng and Chan proposed a biometrics-based cryptosystem that combines biometrics with a public-key infrastructure ͑PKI͒. 24 The cryptosystem consists of three stages: the shape matching, the feature coding, and the private-key generation. Specifically, Feng and Chan used the feature coding and the private-key generation stages to protect the extracted signature features and perform user authentication. 24 Three boundaries are defined for each feature considered:
• the whole boundary, which includes all possible values for a feature; • the database boundary, which includes the values collected from all acquired signatures; • the user boundary, which includes values for a particular user.
The user boundary ͑UB͒ is defined as UB = ͓T − b ϫ T , T + b ϫ T ͔, where T and T are the mean and standard deviation of the features obtained from the user's signatures, respectively. The system parameter b can be adjusted depending on the desired performance: a bigger value allows more error tolerance but guarantees less robustness to forgeries. The feature coding implies the segmentation of the whole boundary, which is divided into several segments, each with an assigned sequence number. The segmentation takes place by unfolding the user boundary to both ends before exceeding the database boundary. The superfluous portion at either end would be extended into the whole boundary and becomes one segment. Considering a particular feature value, the system fits it into a segment and obtains the feature code, i.e., the segment's sequence number. After processing all the features, the feature codes are concatenated to output a code string. The template includes the boundary definitions without any hint on a particular segment.
In order to obtain a private key from the obtained code string, a SHA1-hash is then computed, resulting in a 160-bit private key.
